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II. ROADMAP
This Note will first provide a definition for what constitutes hospital "readmissions" under the Affordable Care Act. Next, it will highlight the economic harm readmissions pose to federal spending and reining in the budget deficit. Third, this Note will explain Congress' proposed solution to this problem-namely, the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Programand its intended outcome of reducing Medicare costs. The majority of this Note will then consist in analyzing the unintended consequences on hospitals and patients, both directly and indirectly, using interviews with Indiana hospital administrators and published data regarding the successful readmissions reduction efforts of various states and hospitals. 3 The Note will conclude by offering possible improvements on the current state of the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program.
III. OVERVIEW OF PROBLEM
The phenomenon of hospital readmissions is a prevalent and costly one. According to a 2009 study in the New England Journal of Medicine, almost one-fifth (19.6%) ofhospitalized Medicare patients are readmitted to a hospital within 30 days of their initial stay. 4 In 2004, unplanned rehospitalizations cost taxpayers roughly $17.4 billion of the total $102.6 billion the government disbursed for Medicare. 5 All told, nearly seventeen percent of the Medicare budget was spent on unplanned readmissions. 6 Congress attempted to address this problem as part of the recently passed Affordable Care Act. 7 The particular provision, the so-called "Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program'.s ("HRRP" or "Program") goes into effect October 1, 2012, and stipulates that the government will begin toreduce the amount it pays to hospitals with "excess readmissions" 9 of patients.
The Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") predicts that this program 9. Seegenerally42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(4)(C) (2010) .
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CONSEQUENCES OF PENALIZING HOSPITAL READMISSIONS 363 alone will save Medicare an aggregate $7.1 billion by fiscal year 2019. 10 However, the measure may have at least three unintended consequences: (A) a decrease in quality of care; (B) a decrease in access to care for minorities; and (C) an increase in hospital financial distress, including increased prevalence of bankruptcy.
A. Decrease in Care Quality
Cash-strapped hospitals will need to conserve as much federal money as they can, which may create a conflict of interest between quality of care delivered and hospital bottom lines. In an interview with the National Law Journal, Anna Grizzle, a partner at Bass, Berry, and Sims in Nashville, Tennessee, who represents health care providers, explained that cost-cutting will be "crucial" to the survival of publicly funded hospitals in the era of the Affordable Care Act. u She anticipates that hospitals will be faced with more difficult dilemmas as to who should receive care and under what conditions: " [F] or example, a patient who comes in with a heart attack, is that person readmitted for care?" 12 The humanitarian in us hopes so; however, under the Affordable Care Act, the hospital will be penalized for this readmission. Therefore, hospitals will "need to look for ways to ensure those patients are not readmitted. '' 13 This may create a kind of race to the bottom in which hospitals are forced to cut back on services in order to remain viable. Indeed, a New England Journal of Medicine study published in December 2011 found, somewhat paradoxically, that there was "a substantial association" between "overall [hospital] admission rates" and "rates of rehospitalization."14 The study indicated that "lower utilization of hospital services might be more successful in reducing readmissions" 15 than other methods tried to date.
B. Decrease in Minority Access to Care
Beyond the problem of care quality lies the troubling fact that readmissions tend to be higher in hospitals that treat a greater proportion of Af- [Vol. 9:1 rican-Americans and needy patients. 16 This situation makes sense considering the direct correlation between inferior socio-economic conditions and poor population health. 17 In addition, patients who are beneficiaries ofboth Medicare and Medicaid-a status known as dual-eligibility-are monitored on a yearly basis, rather than a simple thirty-day cycle. 18 Thus, hospitals treating dual-eligible patients have an entire yearlong period during which to worry about preventing readmissions. Dual-eligible patients also tend to be sicker than the average Medicare enrollee. 19 Add to this the fact that more than half of public hospital patients are racial and ethnic minorities, 20 and it becomes· readily apparent that the hospitals that have the most to lose are those with higher minority and poor patient populations. If a community hospital is experiencing increased pressure to cut patient services, then the entire community suffers. Thus, the Program may stand to disproportionately penalize public hospitals that are the most tasked with treating minorities and the poor. The danger then becomes that "[r]emaining hospitals, struggling to cope with the costs imposed by an influx of new, mostly poor patients left behind by the places that shut down, will increasingly be overcrowded and understaffed. Services will be curtailed. Facilities will be degraded. Long waits and uneven care could become the norm. " 25 Grizzle likewise predicts that pressures such as these are set to intensify with the implementation of the HRRP? 6
C. IncreasedHospital Financial Distress
Although lawmakers may have been unaware of these unintended consequences at the time the Affordable Care Act was passed, 27 many of these same criticisms were brought before the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") during the notice-and-comment period 28 41 Nonetheless, as evidenced by hospitals with comparatively lower rates of readmission, this problem is potentially a solvable one. For example, 2005 data shows that the fifteen-day readmission rate ranges from six percent for hospitals in the top tenth percentile to double that, or twelve percent, for hospitals in the ninetieth percentile. 42 It should also be noted that readmission rates are affected in large part by the mix of cases a particular hospital sees. 43 In light of this problem and its lack of a clear market-based solution, MedP AC provided the framework for a two-step policy meant to address the problem of excessive readmissions through financial incentives that reward hospitals for reducing their readmission numbers. 44 The first prong of the suggested strategy is to collect and publicize data regarding hospitalspecific readmission rates for certain medical conditions. 45 ''This will ensure that hospitals know their rates and how they compare with those of their peers and will allow beneficiaries and other providers to use this information when they make health care decisions or admit patients.'.46 As the second prong, MedP AC recommends that, "[ a]fter a year or two, public disclosure could be complemented by a change in payment rates, so that hospitals with high risk-adjusted rates of readmission receive lower average per case payments.'o4 7 MedPAC declined to give any guidance as to how or at what rate these lower average case payments were to be meted out. 48 MedP AC also pointed out that holding each provider along the continuum 49 accountable would be an "important parallel policy" to encourage decreasing readmissions, since ultimate success in reducing readmission rates and attendant costs depends upon efficiency and coordination among all members of the provider chain. 50 tives to reward quality care. 5 1 Prior to passage of the Affordable Care Act, CMS began implementing the first prong of the MedP AC strategy. Beginning in 2002, in association with the Hospital Quality Alliance, CMS began collecting data from hospitals on a voluntary basis for the purpose of making "important information about hospital performance accessible to the public and to inform and invigorate efforts to improve quality.'.s 2 With passage of the Affordable Care Act, CMS began requiring hospitals that treat Medicare patients to submit readmissions data, 53 specifically regarding three conditions: acute myocardial infarction (heart attack), congestive heart failure, and pneumonia.54 This data is available on the CMS "Hospital Compare" Internet website. 55 The website also includes a comparison of each hospital's statistics to national averages. While patients and potential patients have undoubtedly benefited through greater transparency and a larger volume of data to compare in making hospital decisions, the program lacked any real mechanism to encourage hospitals to reduce readmissions until passage of the Affordable Care Act. (B) Ratio. The ratio described in this subparagraph for a hospital for an applicable period is equal to 1 minus the ratio of--(i) the aggregate payments for excess readmis-· sions ... and
(ii) the aggregate payments for all discharges ..
(4) Aggregate payments, excess readmission ratio defined. For purposes of this subsection: (A) [T]he term "aggregate payments for excess readmissions" means, for a hospital for an applicable period, the sum, for applicable conditions ... , of the product, for each applicable condition, of--(i) the base operating DRG payment amount for such hospital for such applicable period for such condition;
(ii) the number of admissions for such condition for such hospital for such applicable period; and (iii) the excess readmissions ratio . . . for such hospital for such applicable period minus l.
(B) [T]he term "aggregate payments for all discharges" means, for a hospital for an applicable period, the sum of the base operating DRG payment amounts for all discharges for all conditions from such hospital for such applicable period.
(C) Excess readmission ratio. (i) [T] he term "excess readmissions ratio" means, with respect to an applicable condition for a hospital for an applicable 369 period, the ratio (but not less than 1.0) of-(1) the risk adjusted readmissions based on actual readmissions ... for an applicable hospital for such condition with respect to such applicable period; to (II) the risk adjusted expected readmissions . . . for such hospital for such condition with respect to · such applicable period. 61 [Vol. 9:1
In other words, starting in fiscal year 2013, the typical, prospective di:-agnosis related group ("DRG") payment that Medicare makes to a hospital will be reduced based on the number of readmissions at that hospital above the national average readmission rate 62 for a particular condition. This payment reduction will apply to all Medicare discharges for that condition, even those that did not result in a readmission. 63 Thus, once the threshold is met, the hospital is penalized whether or not it later curtails readmissions for the rest of that year.
Presently, DRG payments are issued prospectively based on the physician's documentation of a patient's diagnosis. 64 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") also takes into account such things as prevailing wage rates in the hospital's geographic region. 65 But these base amounts are always multiplied by the DRG ''weight" as an adjustment factor, which varies depending on the national average standardized cost per case for a specific type of diagnosis. 66 The weights are generalized based on diagnosis because they are· intended to account for cost variations between different treatments for the same condition; some patients may re~ quire more costly care (for example, a longer-than-average hospital stay) while some patients may respond extremely well to less expensive treat-
62. There is actually nothing in the statute that mentions national averages per se, but DRG payments are currently calculated based on such a scheme, and MedPAC's Jun~ 2007
Report to tlle Congress, from which many of tlle ideas for tlle PP ACA's readmissions reduction provision came, calculated expected rates as based on ''the average rate of readmission across all hospitals, controlling for all patient refined diagnosis related group and severity class of patients." Presumably, tlle term "risk adjusted expected readmissions" takes into account a national average. See MEDICARE ment. 67 In the end, these payments should average out to properly reimburse the hospital for its costs of care. Thus, the "excess readmissions ratio" limits the base operating DRG payments in an amount equal to the ratio of actual readmissions to "expected readmissions.'.6 8 The statute does not give a definition of how expected readmissions should be calculated, but the CMS final rule states that expected readmissions are the sum of ''the probability of readmission for each patient at an average hospital. ,.69 The probability of readmission is calculated using "[t]he intercept term for the model (the same for all hospitals ... )" and "[t]he increase or decrease in the probability of readmission contributed by each of the patient's risk factors (risk adjustment coefficients multiplied by the patient's risk factors ... ).'' 70 The statute defines a "readmission" as, "in the case of an individual who is discharged from an applicable hospital, the admission of the individual to the same or another applicable hospital within a time period specified by the Secretary from the date of such discharge.'.n The final rule provided that ''The time period specified ... is 30 days.'m Within the three categories of so-called "endorsed measures,'m Congress carved out "exclusions for readmissions that are unrelated to the prior discharge (such as a planned readmission or transfer to another applicable hospital)." 74 However, in 2015, the HHS Secretary shall, to the extent practicable, expand the applicable conditions beyond the 3 conditions for which measures have been endorsed . . . to the additional 4 conditions that have been identified by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission in its report to Congress in June 2007 and to other conditions and procedures as determined appropriate by the Secretary. 75 These other ·~appropriate" conditions will be updated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services through regulations/ 6 but CMS indicated that it initially still "plan [ s] [Vol. 9:1 pulmonary disease (COPD), coronary artery bypass graft surgery (CABG), percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA), and "other vascular" surgery admissions. 79 There are certain limited exemptions to the readmissions payment reduction for "sole community hospitals" and for "medicare-dependent, small rural hospitals.'.so Hospitals which treat ''fewer than a minimum number (as determined by the Secretary) of discharges for such applicable condition for the applicable period'.s 1 are also exempt from the payment reduction. Apparently Congress thought that the importance of maintaining access to these hospitals outweighed the risk of possible service cutbacks or financial decline as a result of the Program.
Finally, the Affordable Care Act's HRRP 82 includes a "floor adjustment factor," which cannot be lower than 83 This means that the largest potential payment reduction a hospital could receive would be 1% in fiscal year 2013, 2% in fiscal year 2014, and 3% in fiscal years 2015 and beyond. 84 This "phased-in approach'.s 5 allows hospitals some time to ease into the program and make adjustments before the full penalty kicks into effect.
Other provisions within the Affordable Care Act require that, by March 2012, the HHS Secretary develop ''reporting requirements" for use by health plans to "implement activities to prevent hospital readmissions through a comprehensive program for hospital discharge that includes patient-centered education and counseling, comprehensive discharge planning, and F,St discharge reinforcement by an appropriate health care professional."8 Some may say these reporting and concrete program implementation requirements should sugpiant, rather than augment, any requirement for total readmission rates.
Nonetheless, Congress apparently saw both as important as it ultimately required both.
There 96 The rehospitalization rate was wholly 45% higher in the five states that had the highest rates than in the five states that had the lowest rates. 97 Generally, the Western states (with the exceptions of California and Arizona) had the lowest readmission rates while the Eastern and Midwestern states had the highest rates. 98 While regional differences in physician mentality or patient compliance may account for some of these differences, it cannot adequately explain, for example, why lllinois had a 21.7% readmission rate while just to the north, Wisconsin had only 17.00/o; or why Kentucky had a 21.2% readmission rate while neighboring Indiana had only a 17.7% rate. 99 While these differences may be baffling, they tend to point toward an important reality: readmission rates may be, more or less, within a provider's control. Perhaps, then, Texas (19.4% readmissionsi 00 could learn something from New Mexico (16.3% readmissions), 101 and hospitals nationwide could learn something from Idaho, with its nation-low 13.3% readmission rate. 102 MedP AC and CMS have also indicated their conviction that readmissions are a controllable problem. 103 106 Since the payment reduction factor is determined as a ratio of excess readmissions compared to overall discharges, it seems that hospitals whose numbers are lagging compared to their peers might remedy this predicament by choosing to see more total patients. This would increase the denominator and thereby lower excess readmissions as a portion of overall readmis- [Vol. 9:1
Although the individual health care mandate,us which penalizes individuals who do not obtain health care coverage, may ease pressures on hospitals that treat higher numbers of uninsured patients, due to the Affordable Care Act's concomitant reduction in disproportionate share hospital ("DSH'') payments, 116 the effects of the mandate may be negligible on hospital bottom lines. Prior to the Affordable Care Act, DSH payments were structured such that hospitals which provided care to a large number oflowincome patients, such as those with Medicaid and the uninsured, could be at least partially compensated for their efforts. 117 DSH payments are calculated based on a number of factors, but they are designed to compensate hospitals in proportion to· the number of uninsured and indigent patients the particular hospital serves. 118 Under the Affordable Care Act, however, HHS will reduce DSH payments to hospitals by seventy-five percent beginning in fiscal year 2015. 119 Since readmissions tend to be higher in hospitals that treat more indigents, 120 these hospitals will be hit doubly hard--losing reimbursements for readmissions while no longer. getting the DSH payments to which they are accustomed. By misplacing provider incentives, this sort of reimbursement scheme will tend to .have a disproportionate impact on the very hospitals providing the most benefit to society• s most vulnerable members. Again, the impact of this. reduction may be eased by the individual health care mandate, but the mandate itself allows for individuals to pay a fee to opt out of health care coverage, 121 and violators may be difficult to track or bring to justice for a number of years because the IRS and HHS must work together to reconcile their records in order to catch freeloaders.
Related is the issue of what types of conditions the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program includes in its payment reduction. With the increasing number of specialty hospitals, those that are not in the business of treating patients with one of the three specified conditions 122 will get off nearly scot-free while specialty heart hospitals which treat a disproportion-115 ately high number of patients with congestive heart failure or heart attack will stand to be unfairly penalized. Or worse, these specialty hospitals may opt not to treat Medicare patients at all, placing an ever-increasing burden of the sickest and oldest patients (who generally cannot afford private insurance) on Medicare hospitals. 123 A Journal of Hospital Medicine study showed that when providers were more proactive with heart failure patient follow-up, including visit reminders, education, and regular feedback, 124 they actually tended to see higher twelve-month readmission rates ( 490/o compared to 36% for the baseline group 125 ), but lower mortality rates (24% compared to 30% for the baseline 12 1. A similar study published in the Archives of Internal Medicine compared readmission rates and mortality rates in patients who were part of a multidisciplinary, post-discharge heart failure management program and patients who received the usual follow-up care. 127 Here, the participants in the special post-discharge program experienced "significantly decrease[ d]" hospital readmissions, but no affect on mortality rates. 128
These studies expose a potential inconsistency between the desired outcome of the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (better long .. term health) and the likely result of the provision (immediate cost savings, but worse long-term health), indicating a misplaced incentive. It may be more appropriate to place the incentive on reducing mortality rates-which could be said to be the end goal of any medical care--rather than on readmissions, which may or may not indicate a failure of care quality. In· one of the studies referenced above, the patients who were readmitted with less :frequency actually died sooner than those who were readmitted more readi- 134 However, Clark was hesitant to say that one method will work in all cases or that some combination of methods would not be more efficacious. So perhaps the statespecific readmissions data cited above 135 might ultimately be less portable than it appears. The problem with any of the methods mentioned by Dr. Clark; however, is that they are all very expensive to implement and monitor. Beyond the huge initial cost of an electronic device for a patient, for example, lies the latent costs of monitoring, data gathering, and data storage for scores of targeted patients, all of which would be necessary for such a program to work properly and have any hope of achieving its desired result. Certain studies have seemed to bolster some of the aforementioned methods. For example, one study of Philadelphia hospitals found· that readmissions could be reduced by forty-five percent over a twenty-four-week period by having nurses meet repeatedly with high-risk patients. 136 Other studies have shown the effectiveness of prompt telephone follow-up 137 or hiring a ''transition coach" to ease elderly patients' passage from hospital to home. 138 One model that has proven successful is the Re-Engineered Discharge program, dubbed "Project RED.'' 139 Developed at Boston University Medical Center, Project RED utilizes specially trained registered nurses called "discharge advocates" to help with eleven essential components of the discharge and handoff process:
(1) educating patients about their condition, (2) making appointments for clinician follow-up and postdischarge testing, (3) discussing tests and studies with patients, (4) organizing post-discharge services, (5) confirming medication plans, ( 6) reconciling discharge plans with national guidelines, (7) teaching patients to identify and deal with emergency medical situations, (8) expediting the transmission of the dis-131. This entails equipping the patient with a PDA or other electronic device that automatically sends health data back to the physician.
132. This typically involves a nurse or other practitioner who administers care at the patient's home.
133. A process which would include making telephone contact with the patient, especially within the crucial first few days after a discharge.
134. In other words, making sure the patient's medicines are not hindering each other's efficacy or causing other side effects due to interaction.
135 charge summaries to outpatient physicians, (9) asking patients to explain their care plans to assess patient's degree of understanding, (1 0) giving patients written discharge plans at the time of discharge, and ( 11) providing telephone support shortly after discharge to reinforce the patient's discharge plan. 140 
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In one study involving Project RED, the 370 patients enrolled in the program were one-third less likely to be readmitted to the hospital than the control group, who did not participate in the program. More than ninety percent of program participants received some form of follow-up within twenty-four hours ofleaving the hospital. 141 The fact that more than half of rehospitalized patients have not seen a physician between discharge and readmission 142 seems easily remedied, but the costs of doing so for the hundreds of thousands of patients a large hospital might see per year would be staggering. The economic harm is especially great given that there is no reward under the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program for reducing readmissions, only a penalty for not doing so.l43
Another promising solution, currently underway at selected Kaiser Permanente hospitals in California, is the use of handheld video cameras to monitor chronically ill patients readmitted within thirty days. 144 Kaiser's so-called "video ethnography" program involves arming caregivers and social scientists with video cameras in order to record interviews with patients.145 The team accompanies patients home to see how medications are being managed and to interview aides and family members in order to establish a sense of how well the patient is managing his or her medication regimen. 146 They also interview pharmacists, home health providers, nurses, and other physicians in an effort to get an accurate (and intimate) overall picture of how the patient is managing his or her condition. 147 143. This predicament is discussed in more depth in Janice Simmons, Reducing Readmissions: Are Quality Payments a Carrot or Stick? HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/page-1/QUA-245642/Reducing-Readmissions-AreQuality-Payments-a-Carrot-or-Stick ("With the rates of readmissions initially higher for poorer population groups, hospitals treating them will be penalized even when they try to bring these readmissions down from a high level." (quoting Richard Cooper, M.D.)).
144 A final example of a successful readmission reduction effort is the integrated· community approach to health care taken by the community of Grand·Junction, Colorado. 151 The community includes a mixture of Medicare-and Medicaid-eligible individuals, lJut the dominant payer in the region is a non-profit health maintenance organization ( .. HMO"), Rocky Mountain Health Plans. 152 The success of this model is largely attributed to the HMO's great influence over all providers in its network. 153 Examples of Rocky Mountain Health Plans' influence include "requiring providers to serve all lines of business; paying for medical review across settings to improve care coordination; reinvesting profits in community priorities, such as an electronic information exchange; and providing mobile and Web-based clinical support tools and generic drug samples to individual providers." 154 This was complemented by"mature" health care services and practices such as "information exchange, equitable payment arrangements, shared support of the clinic for the poor, and expectations of regular exchanges of site visits among members of the medical community."ISS This integrated system allowed the community's dominant provider, St. Mary's Hospital, to achieve significantly lower rehospitalization rates and post-hospitalization mortality rates as compared with twenty comparison hospitals. 156 The major drawback with a managed care approach like Grand Junction's is that it seems better suited for smaller communities with only one or two major providers, but may be substantially more difficult to implement in a larger city with a more complicated provider network.
Iri short, while some hospitals and health systems have found ways of reducing readmissions-at least in the near term-the above case studies also reveal an important reality confronting hospitals as they seek to navigate the Hospital Readmissions 161 Having read the same JAMA report, Cooper surmised that the data shows, even as early physician follow-up visits increased, the percent of readmissions stayed constant. 162 In other words, according to Cooper, there is no correlation between early follow-up and a reduction in hospital readmission rates.
But perhaps Orszag and Cooper are both putting the cart before the horse. A study by medical researchers at the Cleveland Clinic suggests that readmissions may not even be an accurate measure of long-term patient outcomes. 163 Although the conventional wisdom is that a patient being re-157. It seems Congress may have been aware of the nebulous nature of the problem, as the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program includes a provision exempting "sole community hospitals" and "Medicare-dependent, small rural hospitals" from its payment penalties. Apparently, even Congress was afraid some hospitals would not be able to lower readmissions rates on their own. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(2)(B)(i) (2010 admitted to the hospital within thirty days of an initial stay is a wasteful use of resources and a sign of poor-quality care generally, the study observed that, at least in the case of heart failure patients, being readmitted to the hospital after an inpatient stay may actually preserve a patient's life. 164 In an analysis of newly available government data for 3857 hospitals, the researchers discovered that higher readmission rates following an initial hospitalization for heart failure actually correlated with a lower risk-adjusted, thirty-day death rate. 165 In 2000, a survey of some nineteen readmission studies carried out over the previous ten years concluded starkly, "[M]ost readmissions seem to be caused by unmodifiable causes, and ... pending an agreed-on method to adjust for confounders, global readmission rates are not a useful indicator of quality of care." 166 Perhaps, then, penalizing readmissions is not the soundest way of reducing Medicare costs after all. Rather, "[t]his needs to be investigated further and we need to improve it" 167 in order to avoid unnecessarily decreasing care quality in the name of costcutting. 168 Although the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program is a start, it is far from perfect. The major problem with the program is that it attempts to do too much in one fell swoop. The program simultaneously gathers uniform data among hospitals, publicizes those results, and metes out monetary penalties. This may lead to an overextension of HHS resources, especially given the relatively short timeframe in which providers must comply.
While gathering more data on the issue is undoubtedly a key to appropriately and intelligently tackling the problem of excess readmissions, the fact that hospital readmission data will become public serves to doubly penalize hospitals that take a bit longer to find a workable remedial mechanism. Since there are so many plausible solutions but no one-size-fits-all choice, Congress or CMS should consider implementing the two phases of the program at different times: first, implementing the standards and conducting data-gathering, and second, penalizing for persistently high readmission rates.
health/heart/articles/20 I 0/07 /14/high-readmission-rates-may-not-mean-worse-hospitalcare.html.
164 Admittedly, this approach may not save as much money as originally devised. However, one major point of suspicion in the government's logic is the CBO budget estimates on which the program relies. The CBO's budget estimates continue to increase at a near-perfect linear rate even for the four years after the floor atljustment factor has reached its peak in 2015. 169 Perhaps the rates are predicted to level off soon thereafter (the CBO estimate runs only through 20 19), but it is highly dubious that the amount of money saved from the program would continue to increase even after the highest reduction in reimbursements has leveled out and hospitals have presumably adapted to the new measures the Affordable Care Act has put in place.
Another major weakness of the HRRP is a lack of clear goals, as demonstrated by incorrect or vague definitions of important terminology. As one example, CMS has neglected to exclude unrelated readmissions in its assessment of penalties to hospitals. When confronted with concerns over the fairness of this practice and asked to exclude readmissions related to random events, CMS responded, "In our view, readmissions that are truly unrelated to the hospitalization should not affect some hospitals more than others, because these readmissions should have the same probability of occurring for similarly situated patients, regardless of where the patient was initially hospitalized." 17° Conceding that the measure is inadequate but yet will produce no prejudice due to uniform application amounts to a shirking of CMS' important responsibilities. Consistently employing a misguided standard does not magically transform it into a sensible one.
The fact is CMS was presented with a logical and viable second option in crafting its standard for potentially preventable readmissions. In 2008, several doctors and medical researchers with 3M Health Information Systems created a method for determining whether a readmission is "potentially preventable." 171 Using "computerized discharge abstract data," 172 the system employs a mathematical formula "based on the relationship between the reason for the original admission and the reason for the readmission. " 173 Doctors and researchers developed over 98,000 admission-readmission diagnosis pairs for the computerized system and categorized them according INDIANA HEALTH LAw REVIEW [Vol. 9:1 to whether or not they were clinically related and therefore preventable. 174 Clinical diagnoses from over five million hospital admissions in Florida between 2004 and 2005 were used as raw data, which, after accounting for cases that could not be used (for example, cases in which the patient died), left over three million admissions as valid data points. 175 The results of the study show how few readmissions are truly related to their initial diagrioses. For example, even the two medical and surgical diagnoses with the largest percentage of potentially preventable readmissions barely reached the twenty percent threshold for rate of readmissions being potentially preventable.176 Thus, according to this detailed study, at least eighty percent of readmissions are completely unrelated to their initial diagnoses.
The 3M method recognizes the reality that any "analysis of hospital readmissions is complicated by the fact that not all readmissions are preventable, even with optimal care." 177 CMS, on the other hand, ignores this fact and simply resigns itself to reasoning that if a measurement applies equally across all parties involved, it must be fair. The 3M study shows that, under CMS' structuring of the HRRP, hospital readmission results will be attributable solely to fortune (or lack thereof) about eighty percent of the time. This is unacceptable in a system designed to pay for performance. CMS' s reason for rejecting the 3M study was that it "did not accurately specify what is related or unrelated simply by looking at the diagnoses for the admission and the readmission" 178 and that the idea of excluding unrelated readmissions "could be subjective and prohibitively complex." 179 Instead, CMS adopted an approach that examines readmissions, the sample size for each qualifying hospital, and "[p]atient-risk factors, including age, and chronic medical conditions" 180 to calculate a ''risk-standardized readmission ratio for each hospital." 181 This risk-standardized readmission ratio is ''then multiplied by the national crude rate of readmission for the given condition to produce a risk-standardized readmission rate." 182 Somehow, CMS reasons that this system will be less subjective and complex than the carefully crafted 3M computer program. Moreover, the 3M study made clear distinctions between related, preventable readmissions and unrelated, unpreventable readmissions; whereas, as applied in the statute and regulations, the term ''potentially preventable" is never even examined or truly defmed in a way that makes it a functional benchmark for hospitals to use 174 One final weakness of the HRRP is that it provides that other "applicable conditions" 183 may be chosen by the Secretary of HHS. This would happen through regulations rather than via statute, circumventing Congress' deliberative processes and the certainty that is provided through clear rules set out in advance.
X. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
While the problems with the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program are various, the solutions may be equally so. Although each hospital is, at present, left to fend for itself against the imminent threat of possible payment reductions due to excess readmissions, struggling hospitals would do well to take note of some of the successful models in place at other hospitals explained above. Since there appears to be no panacea, perhaps it is best that neither Congress nor HHS has yet mandated a specific readmission reduction regimen as part of its Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program. Allowing hospitals to self-determine their game plans at least retains a measure of competition between providers that allows the savvy to survive and prosper. Even among the two-thirds of urban U.S. hospitals operating as nonprofits, 184 most of which are tax-exempt and must therefore reinvest net income and abide by certain other governmental restrictions/ 85 there is a great degree of latitude in terms of operational decisionmaking. 186 Still, there are certain actions Congress should take to amend the Aff-ordable Care Act, which will allow it to be more effective in easing readmissions and more realistic in incentivizing hospitals to help out in the effort.
Perhaps Congress' principal oversight in drafting the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program is that readmissions are not the best measure of hospital quality. 187 Even so, reducing readmissions is a worthy endeavor, as it leads to cost savings and greater satisfaction among patients, payers, and providers. 188 Another major policy problem with the program is that it attempts to do too much all at once. By simultaneously gathering uniform
